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LEGAL RESPONSES TO POLLUTION
PROBLEMS-THEIR STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSESt
ANDREW R. THOMPSONtt
Scientists in many disciplines are conducting the research necessary to identify and describe the factors causing today's deterioration
of the natural environment. In the Arctic regions of Alaska and
northern Canada, for example, both industry and government are
sponsoring research into basic matters such as tundra productivity
and technological impacts such as the building of hot oil pipelines
over permafrost. The scientists both contribute and respond to the
public outcry that the environment be defended. As the news media
learn about hazards from the scientists they stoke the firest of public
concern. Political action ensues. If a technology for coping with
environmental damage is known, lawyers and legislators are asked to
devise the legal means for bringing this technology to bear on pollution problems. What can legal science do?
The law can respond in four ways. It can apply the coercive power
of the state to the pollution offender; it can manipulate the incentives and disincentives of the economic system to bring pressure on
the offender; it can organize the administrative and institutional
structures of the state to control the offender; and it can contribute
to the consciousness of citizens that the natural environment must
not be abused.
COERCIVE POWERS OF THE STATE
Punish the polluter! If a fine is an insufficient deterrent, impose a
prison sentence! Penalties for oil spills from tankers are prescribed as
high as $100,000 per day for Arctic waters.' Fines in excess of
$1,000,000 were levied on Chevron Oil Company last year for failure
to install required down hole safety devices on 90 oil wells off the
Louisiana coast in the United States. In addition to penalties, close
down the offending operation! An Imperial Oil exploration near
Tuktoyaktuk in northern Canada was closed down in the summer of
1971 by government order because of the company's failure to take
steps to avoid surface disturbance at its equipment-staging areas.'
fOriginally prepared for the Twelfth Pacific Science Congress, Section C 1.3, Legal and
Political Problems of Environmental Management.
ttFaculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
1. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 2 (1st Supp. 1970); Canada
Shipping Act, Can. Rev. Star. c. 38 (1970-71), amending Can. Rev. Stat. c. 38 (1st Supp.

1970).
2. The Sun (Vancouver, B.C.), Aug. 6, 1971.
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The first demand of the alarmed citizen when a pollution crisis
occurs is usually resort to the coercive powers of the state. Indeed,
the layman often has only this simplistic model of prohibition and
penalty in his mind when he thinks of the legal system in relation to
the environment.
Nor is his model unrealistic, for modem statutes are replete with
penalty provisions. More sophisticated legal measures are needed to
cope with pollution problems. Penalties, after all, usually operate
after the harm has been done. The initiation of prosecutions is
usually sporadic and haphazard rather than planned and coordinated.' If money penalties are stated in inadequate amounts,
they may serve only as cheaply priced licenses to pollute. 4 They
require careful statement and definition because of the criminal law
tradition requiring penal statutes be given a strict interpretation in
favor of the accused person. Yet, the highly technical nature of
pollution problems may preclude such precise and careful definition.' Again, the criminal law tradition presumes in favor of
innocence and requires strict proof of an offense. The difficulties of
establishing cause and effect between deposits of wastes in a stream
and injury to fish, and giving convincing demonstration of an
accurate use of the Ringlemann opacity test for air pollution are two
current Canadian illustrations of the resistance to successful criminal
prosecution inherent in cases where the offense is based on highly
complex processes.6
Before considering more sophisticated legal responses to pollution
problems, something more must be said to place the role of the
criminal sanction in proper perspective. While prohibitions and
penalties, standing by themselves, can be downgraded as means of
dealing with pollution problems, they in fact are incorporated into
almost all types of legal responses to pollution whether these
responses be manipulation of the economic system or reorganization
of the administrative system, or whether they take some other form.
In the economic type of response, such as the imposition of effluent
charges through a permit system, a penalty is usually imposed for
violation of the terms of the permit;7 in an administrative response,
such as a contingency plan for dealing with oil spills, it is made an
offense to fail to report an oil spill to the authorities. The 1971
3. Good, Anti-Pollution Legislation and Its Enforcement-An EmpiricalStudy, 6 U.B.C.
L. Rev. 271 (1971).

4. Id.
5. Difficulties in. defining standards for "pure" water and "clean" air are notorious.
6. Lucas, Legal Techniques for Pollution Control: The Role of the Public, 6 U.B.C. L.
Rev. 167, 174 (1971).

7. Northern Inland Waters Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 28, § 32 (1st Supp. 1970).
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amendments to the CanadaShipping Act contain an array of offenses
supporting its scheme for controlling pollution from ships. These
include failure to report an accidental spill or the sighting of an oil
slick, failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility for cleanup costs and damages resulting from a spill, failure to assist pollution
prevention officers in the performance of their duties, failure to have
certificates of compliance for ships, failure to comply with regulations respecting ship construction, fittings and supplies, and so on.
This profusion of offenses might suggest either a repressive society or
a paucity of available legal techniques for gaining compliance with
the control regime. In my view neither suggestion provides a full
explanation. In a significant number of cases the penalty may be the
only practical way of introducing an economic disincentive to harmful conduct. When you add the moral force that a prosecution brings
to bear on the offender to the injury that his reputation suffers, the
penalty can be an impressive deterrent particularly if the offender
cultivates an image as a concerned and responsible citizen. But the
chief reason for the pervasive use of the criminal sanction seems to
be that it operates as a sort of "fail-safe" mechanism. When all other
legal devices for gaining compliance with the control regime fail,
there is always the prosecution of an offender to fall back on.
Someone can be made to pay! The public conscience can be
appeased!
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
A convincing number of experts in a variety of disciplines assert
that the main responses to pollution problems must be economic
ones.' In language an economist might use, the need is to introduce
into entrepreneurial decision-making, whether private or public,
some mechanism for costing the impact of decisions on common
property resources such as air, water and the other components of
the natural enviornment. A geographer, J. W. MacNeill, observes in a
recent Canadian study that "Indeed, some experts view environmental management largely as a problem of 'internalizing' these external costs." 9 Allen V. Kneese, a well-known United States resource
economist, argues that "our present environmental problems, at least
their environmental pollution aspects, are primarily a result of
failures in our system of economic incentives." ' 0
The problem seems to be that our market system, to which we
8. See, e.g., U.K. Royal Comm'n on Pollution, Rep. of Feb. 1971.
9. J. MacNeil, Environmental Management 16 (1971). Constitutional Study Prepared for
the Government of Canada, Information Canada.
10. A. Kneese, Protecting Our Environment and Natural Resources in the 1970's, 191
(Resources for the Future Reprint No. 88, 1971).
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normally entrust the allocation of natural resources, is not geared to
giving recognition to the interest in maintaining a healthy and
harmonious environment. In the market trade-off of our many
competing and conflicting individual and corporate interests, no one
is asserting the environmental interest. Further, even if environmental impacts are taken into account by concerned entrepreneurs,
our economic system encourages a short-sighted approach. An
adequate return on investment is usually the ultimate arbiter of the
entrepreneurial decision, and, unfortunately, natural resource
ventures are usually associated with high risks and therefore compel
short pay-out periods. If a decision to undertake a venture must be
based on a calculated pay-out of investment and profit in ten years
(not an unusual period in mining and oil ventures), the entrepreneur
cannot be expected to give serious weight to a prognosis that fifteen
years from now, his project may have damaging environmental effects. It is a conundrum of our times that our ability to anticipate
and plan for the future is in inverse ratio to the rate of technological
change; the faster the rate of change, the shorter the future time
period when technological circumstances can be predicted as a basis
for decision-making today. Natural scientists and engineers may well
ponder this conundrum when next they are tempted to berate social
scientists and politicians for failing to keep the social system abreast
of technological developments. In economic terms, this faster rate of
technological change means increasing factors of uncertainty and
risk, higher discounts for these factors, shorter investment pay-out
periods, and therefore shorter forward planning.
Technology offers new aids to planning which may tend to offset
this spiral of uncertainty; indeed, a whole new science of futurology
is emerging. Techniques such as computer simulation give the planner
the ability to manipulate masses of data, they provide him with
probability rankings of the results of such manipulations, and they
correct his interpretations of these results by feedback systems.'
But they cannot foretell the future and they cannot by themselves
change the time criteria for business investment decisions. Nevertheless, they give promise that decision-making may ultimately catch up
with technology.
In a broader sense, the policy being advocated is that decisionmaking in the market system be given the kind of holistic input that
the science of ecology, itself, demands-a consideration of the whole
spectrum of internal and external effects over a long range of time.12
11. Systems science applications in environmental impact studies are advocated by
Robert F. Scott, Effects of Ecology on Technological Change, Proceedings of the 20th
Alaska Science Conference (1970).
12. It is chastening to note that in putting forward an ideal environmental management
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How can this change be accomplished? How can these externalities
be introduced into the investment decision? The very definition of
the common property resource is that it is not "owned" and therefore no one is pricing it in the marketplace. In the context of pollution control, many suggestions for change have been advanced, from
the creation of private property in pollution rights' ' to the introduction of effluent charges which would amount to publicly administered prices for waste discharge.' I In terms of protection of
elements in the natural environment, significant research work by
economists is leading to the ability to place helpful price estimates
on such common property resources as wildlife and recreation landscapes.1 s But, obviously, when benefits of an aesthetic nature such
as a wilderness solitude or a scene of great natural beauty are
bestowed by the environment,6 values become too subjective for
anything but arbitrary pricing.'
Many scientists react with undisguised hostility to suggestions that
economic answers should be sought for pollution problems. After all,
it is argued, the main, underlying threat to the environment stems
from preoccupation with the dollar and with the claimed necessity of
annual increases in the Gross National Product. Such reaction is too
simplistic and ascribes to economics that which the discipline
denies-a value system. Rather, the concern of economics is to
quantify benefits and detriments. It presumes that to the extent that
benefits and detriments can be quantified, decision-making can be
simplified and improved.
From a lawyer's viewpoint, with his long scan over the history of
legal sanctioning of desirable human conduct, the manipulation of
economic factors as an answer to pollution problems has one great
advantage. This advantage is that the decision to pursue this course
or that, to incur this environmental cost or gain that environmental
benefit, is a decision by the doer himself, without external coercion,
and within the dictates of his own conscience and self-interest. This
preference for individual choice may be regarded as merely a reflecprogram, 30 years was considered almost impossibly remote for future planning, supra note
9, at 24.
13. J. Dale, Pollution, Property and Prices (1968).
14. A. Kneese, Protecting Our Environment and Natural Resources in the 1970's, at 195
(Resources for the Future Reprint No. 88, 1970). The Council on Environmental Quality in
the United States has advocated pollution charges in its annual report, see The Sun (Vancouver, B.C.), Aug. 6, 1971.
15. M. Clawson, Methods of Measuring the Demand for and Value of Outdoor Recreation (Resources for the Future Reprint No. 10, 1959); Pearse, Toward a Theory of Multiple
Use: The Case of Recreation v. Agriculture, 9 Natural Resources J. 561 (1969).
16. It should not be overlooked that individuals do commonly place money values on
mainly aesthetic benefits, as where a fortune is paid for a painting or the owner of land
refuses to sell it at a price substantially above the market.
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tion of Judaic-Christian values, or it may be categorized as a defense
of the so-called free-enterprise, capitalist system. But it should not be
construed as either. A lawyer appreciates how difficult it is to
regulate his fellow man in all his myriad manifestations of conduct
and with all his complex motivations and stratagems to frustrate the
regulatory system. Hence the lawyer respects any mechanism that
reduces the burden on the legal system of gaining acceptable human
conduct, in environmental concerns as in all others.
Nor is the desirability of internalizing environmental costs and
benefits into decision-making applicable only to ventures in a private
enterprise system. Public enterprises such as hydro-electric power
generation are notorious in North America for their myopic vision of
costs and benefits when making decisions such as where to locate a
dam. They are as needful as private enterprise of mechanisms that
a broader range of cost-benefit criteria in decisionwill internalize
1
making. 7
What techniques are available to lawyers to manipulate the economic system in these desirable ways? Obvious ones are changes in
tax laws to provide incentives for the use of pollution-abatement
procedures. 1 Less obvious ones are changes in liability laws. The
imposition of legal liability for injury internalizes the cost of the
injury, forcing the actor to take into account possible damage claims,
at least if he is prudent and has other courses of action. The new
amendments in Canada's shipping laws deal with oil spill damage by
imposing an absolute liability that cannot be evaded by contract
clauses." 9 The more imaginative techniques range from the development of new legal theory that will transform the common property
resource into some form of ownership, to the introduction of new
administrative systems that will inject cost-benefit considerations of
environmental impact into investment decisions.
The new ownership theories will emerge in North America either
through legislation or through the evolution of new common law
concepts. The Canadian Bar Association is currently studying legislative proposals that would, in effect, create public ownership rights in
17. The Bennett Dam in British Columbia is a classic case. The provincially owned
hydroelectric company entirely ignored downstream effects which have resulted in

imperilling a major river delta system. See Death of a Delta (1970).
18. Lucas, Legal Techniques for Pollution Control: The Role of the Public, 6 U.B.C. L.
Rev. 167, 177 (1971).
19. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 2, § 6 (1st Supp. 1970);
Canada Shipping Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 38 (1970-71), amending Can. Rev. Stat. c. 38 (1st
Supp. 1970). To the extent that damage claims are not satisfied, a Pollution Claims Fund
meets the deficiency.
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unpolluted air and water by giving individual citizens the right to
enforce quality standards through the courts. 2 0 A similar public
right has already gained a foothold in the United States both under
statute 2 1 and at common law.2 2 Lawyers like Professor Joseph Sax
of Michigan argue for a legal conceptualization of air and water as
commodities held in trust for the benefit of the entire community of
citizens.2 I In consequence, individual citizens, as beneficiaries of this
trust, have the right through the courts to defend air and water
against invasions by polluters.
A controversial proposal to convert air and water from common
property resources into privately owned resources from a pollution
standpoint has been made by University of Toronto economist J. H.
Dale. He advocates that the pollution-carrying capacity of a drainage
basin should be determined and quantified among various classes of
pollutants, that these quantities should be divided into units each of
which is equivalent to every other in terms of the treatment costs
imposed by it on the drainage basins, and that these units should be
bought and sold as pollution rights on a free market. One could
discharge effluent into the drainage basin only to the extent of purchased pollution rights. The price of the pollution rights would increase as the carrying-capacity of the basin reached its permitted
level, and this increase would operate to allocate the pollution rights
to the most efficient users.2
A less imaginative, but probably more acceptable method of internalizing environmental impacts is the introduction of administrative
systems that impose on resource users a cost reflecting other resource
values foregone or environmental costs imposed, usually by requiring
the resource user to acquire and pay for a permit or license for his
undertaking. Insofar as a permit fee is charged which represents an
attempt to preassess the value of other resource uses foregone or the
cost of environmental damage done, the permit system constitutes an
internalization of these costs. In effect, the resource user has to take
the permit fee into account in doing his personal cost-benefit analysis
of his proposed venture. Examples of such permit fees in Canada are
to be found in the Northern Inland Waters Act" and in the new
20. Resolution of Civil Justice Subsection (B.C. Division) of the Canadian Bar Association, 1970-71.
21. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1971).
22. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
23. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 473 (1970).
24. J. Dale, Pollution, Property and Prices (1968).
25. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 28, § 32 (1st Supp. 1970).
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northern Land Use Regulations." 6 In the former case the fee is to
represent a charge corresponding to the treatment cost imposed on
the water system by the effluent discharge.' 7 In the latter case, the
fee is to represent the value of commercial timber that is destroyed
by line-cutting for seismic surveys.
Something has already been said about the problems of valuing
non-priced items such as wildlife or wilderness resources. But even if
the pricing problem can somehow be solved or evaded, there are
other flaws in the economic model we are building. The public
ownership concept has the serious defect that self-interest is often
highly diluted, resulting in only sporadic enforcement of the public
trust. That is, no single member of the public may consider his
personal interest as a beneficiary of the trust to be sufficient to
justify the costs and stress of a law suit. The answer to the problem is
said to be collective citizen action. North America is witnessing a
phenomenal growth in its citizen conservation and anti-pollution
organizations in defense of national parks, wilderness, wildlife, and
other environmental values. Still, the response, being dependent on
individual initiative in preponderantly unorganized situations, is
mainly sporadic and uncoordinated. Despite this deficiency, the
citizen lawsuit has many advocates as an environmental protection
mechanism. 2
Perhaps its enduring justification will lie in its
ombudsman-like function of spurring government officials to hold
fast to the performance of their duties in defense of the environment.
The flaw in the user charge system is the absence of an automatic
pricing mechanism such as is supplied by exchange in the marketplace. Kneese has described the effluent charge as a "publiclyadministered price" for the privilege of discharging wastes.' 9 This
description recognizes that some public administrative system is
necessary to determine what standards of pollution are acceptable,
what the costs of maintaining these standards will be and how these
costs should be apportioned among the various users of the resource
so that the proper charge can be levied. Consequently, this kind of
manipulation of the market system does not produce the ideal model
of a system operating entirely by the free play of self-interest. Before
26. Gazetted July, 1971. They are made pursuant to Territorial Lands Act, Can. Rev.

Stat. c. 263, § § 12-13 (1952).
27. The President's Council on Environmental Quality in the United States recommends
such effluent charges in its 1970 annual report. The Sun (Vancouver, B.C.), Aug. 6, 1971.
28. See, e.g., Carroll, Participatory Technology, 171 Science 647, 650 (1971); Eddy,
Locus Standi and Environmental Control: A Policy for Comparison, 6 U.B.C. L. Rev. 193,
214 (1971).
29. A. Kneese, supra note 10, at 195.
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self-interest can be triggered, the device must be armed by the deployment by government of a complex administrative system.
This need for an administrative system leads into consideration of
the third method by which the legal system can respond to pollution
problems-and reveals, as did the study of the first method (the use
of criminal sanctions), that these methods are interlinked and overlapping, and that a comprehensive legal response will maximize all
four methods.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES
Those who do not elevate economic solutions to highest priority
in dealing with environmental problems will probably have their
solutions fixed on administrative and institutional responses. If, as
many contend, the pollution problem can be met only by a new
consciousness of man's relationship with nature, man's administrative
and institutional arrangements must undergo radical change to reflect
this new consciousness. 3 0 Even within the context of pragmatic and
evolutionary change, as distinguished from radical change, quite
profound administrative and institutional restructuring must take
place if environmental considerations are to be given high ranking
among today's concerns.
The very emergence of ecology, even as a half understood concept
in the lay mind, forces a re-examination of existing administrative
and institutional structures to discover how well they fit an ecological view of pollution problems, and the results are discouraging. On
the administrative side in Canada we find a river basin system
regulated, not as a river basin at all, but in fragments under a patchwork of incomplete, uncoordinated and often contradictory regimes
imposed by local, regional and national levels of government. 3 ' On
the institutional side, our examination of economic factors bearing
on pollution has shown how inadequately the institution of the
market takes account of environmental factors.
But the lesson is being learned, and the first steps are being taken
in a number of key environmental issues. The federal parliament in
Canada has enacted a Canada Water Act 32 and has introduced a
Canada Clean Air Bill,3 I both aimed at coordinated federalprovincial management of water and air resources with proper regard
for spatial and other ecological characteristics. The Canada Water Act
envisages the management of a water basin such as the Fraser River
30. C. Reich, The Greening of America (1970).
31. J. MacNeill, supra note 9.
32. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 52 (1st Supp. 1970).

33. Bill C-224 (1971).
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system in British Columbia under a management agency that would
have delegated authority under the respective federal and provincial
constitutional powers to enable the formulation and implementation
of a fully comprehensive control regime. Both these statutes are
enabling-that is, they lay the groundwork for the establishment of
air and water quality management, and it remains to be seen whether
the respective levels of government will in fact cooperate as envisioned, and, if they do, how soon and how effectively management
authorities can be organized and become operational. 4
That pollution problems require a holistic and ecological perspective is evidenced in an even more fundamental way by the basic
reorganizations that are taking place both in government and in
business in Canada to reflect an environmental concern. On the
government side, one can cite the transformation of the federal Department of Forestry and Fisheries into the Department of the Environment, and of the Alberta Oil and Gas Conservation Board into
the Energy Resources Conservation Board, with a new mandate to
"control pollution and ensure environment conservation" in energy
resource developments." On the business side, one can note that
large corporations are establishing environmental departments. 3 6
One consortium of natural gas companies is even sponsoring an
independent Environmental Protection Board.3 7
It is obviously beyond the scope of this paper to mention all of
the administrative and institutional reorganizations that are taking
place in Canada. But it may be noted that international initiatives,
too, are directed toward these kinds of changes. One Canadian legal
expert on international waterways predicts that "existing customary
international law on pollution of drainage basins will be largely
ignored. It will be displaced by treaties providing for the management and control of international drainage basins by international
joint agencies.,' 3 8
What is a lawyer's perspective on these administrative changes? He
normally views the administrative process in terms of its impact on
the individual citizen. He is concerned to know whether all affected
interests are represented in the process, and, if not, whether there is
34. For parallel U.S. developments, see Freeman & Haveman, Water Pollution Control,
River Basin Authorities, and Economic Incentives (Resources for the Future Reprint No.

92, 1971).
35. Energy Resources Conservation Act, S.A. c. 30, § 2(4) (1971).
36. E.g., Imperial Oil Limited.
37. The consortium is the Gas Arctic System Study Group, comprising five Canadian and
United States natural gas distribution companies interested in pipelining Prudhoe Bay gas to
United States markets.
38. Bourne, International Law and Pollution of InternationalRivers and Lakes, 6 U.B.C.

L. Rev. 115,136 (1971).
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just cause for exclusions. He will ask what kind of participation in
the process is afforded to the affected individual and will examine
this participation for its fairness according to long established legal
standards of just procedures.
Examined from this lawyer's perspective, protection of the environment is seen as an interest that is entitled to representation in
the administrative process, as much as, from the economist's perspective, environmental protection is an interest that must be
accounted for in the marketplace. The new insight for the lawyer is
that this interest is now being recognized as an interest of individual
citizens and groups of citizens, and not merely as the concern of
resource users and governments. It is a parallel development to the
3 9
newly-emerging citizen's interest under the public trust doctrine .
The argument is that the protection of the public interest exclusively
by government agencies, departments and officials is no longer
adequate. This inadequacy signifies the tendency of government
bureaucracies to become narrow and partisan in discharge of their
responsibilities, and to lose sight of broader public goals and aspirations. The argument is that a mines department becomes a captive of
the mining interests, an oil and gas conservation board of the oil and
gas interests, and a food and drugs directorate of the food processing
and chemical interests. Should this tendency be established,
ombudsman-type procedures are necessary as correctives.
In the environmental context, a protected environment becomes
an interest to be given representation in the administrative process
and this representation is necessary because the role of government
agencies, departments and officials in protecting the environment
needs to be supplemented and fortified by a citizen ombudsman role.
Many problems are encountered in any attempt to open up representation procedures. At what stages in the administrative process
should representation be permitted? How should the issues be
defined? Who should be heard? What sources of information should
be available to them? Should the state provide financial and organizational support? 4" What kinds of representations should be allowed,
39. See p. 232 supra.
40. The significance of these questions can be shown by many examples. In the case of
the Alaska oil pipeline, it is generally recognized that the heavy commitment of planning
and investment prior to the environmental impact hearings by the Secretary of the Interior
foreclosed from the beginning the possibility of an adverse decision. In British Columbia,
the investment of $14,000,000 in mine mill facilities before pollution control hearings on
the tailings and effluent disposal plans of Utah Mining Co. Ltd. was acknowledged by the
pollution control authority as preventing rejection of the company's application for a discharge permit and as limiting the hearing to a consideration of conditions that would be
attached to the permit. In this case, the issues before the hearing tribunal were defined by
the application made by the company. Other issues which environmentalists and commercial
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having in mind the necessities of an efficient hearing process and a
timely decision?
Nor can these questions be answered in an "across the board"
fashion, for it soon appears that each kind of environmental impact
arises in its own set of circumstances with its own special requirements.
A proper representation procedure is illusory without a proper
decision-making authority and executive follow-up. Who should
comprise the authority? By what criteria should it decide as between
competing interests? Should there be a hierarchy of decision-making
for administrative efficiency and appeals? What kind of agency
should carry out the decisions? What kind of feedback control
should give warning when decisions are not being carried out or are
producing different results from those intended? Should the right of
representation include the right to monitor the carrying out of decisions and their effects?
These questions are posed to show the scope and complexity of
the problems that preoccupy lawyers when administrative responses
to pollution problems are proposed. In the United States these problems have, at least in part, been confronted in a bold way, even if
answers are left to be determined in the flux of experience. The
National Environmental Policy Act of 196941 requires all federal
agencies, with respect to every legislative proposal or other federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
to prepare advance statements describing the environmental impact
of the action, any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided, alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship between the local short-term effects and long-term productivity, and
any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources involved
in the action. The significance of this requirement of impact statements is that they will initiate the process of representation, even if
only in terms of letters to congressmen. In many cases federal
agencies are, by their internal requirements, bound by law to hold
fishermen desired to raise were precluded. The statutory provisions which defined the
hearing procedures denied the right to be heard to many organizations and individuals who
obviously had interests that would be affected by the hearing process (commercial
fishermen, for example). As to state assistance in providing information to affected parties
and granting financial support, an Australian example can be cited for its constructive
approach. Public hearings on the question whether oil exploration should be permitted in
the region of the Great Barrier Reef are being conducted by joint federal-state commissions
which can compel the attendance of government witnesses and the disclosure of government
reports. Conservation interests are represented by counsel whose fees and expenses are being
paid by the government.
41. 43 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). See Vannacone, National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 1 Environmental L. 8 (1970).
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public hearings on such statements. To North Americans, the impact
statement hearings by the Department of the Interior on the proposed authorization of a trans-Alaska pipeline system has already
established the importance of this procedure in the fabric of United
States political and constitutional life. The state legislatures are
following suit. 4 2 The next five years will demonstrate whether or
not the environmental interest has been securely anchored in the
policy of the nation.
In Canada, the idea of representation remains relatively undeveloped in the administrative process, being largely confined to the
traditional common law review by the courts when administrators
abuse their jurisdiction. There is as yet no system for representation
in the enactment of delegated legislation (i.e. rule-making by departments of government), 4" and representation in the case of departmental tribunals is not on any systematic basis. Nor is representation
usually available in the early stages of the administrative process.
The Canadian weaknesses are all too apparent. At the present time
the regulations which control the issue of oil and gas permits and
leases in the vast Canadian northern and offshore regions, and
thereby determine the pace and impact of northern development, are
under revision by the responsible government departments, but no
public participation is contemplated (or welcomed!) other than discussions with the two oil and gas industry associations. 4 4 The
Canada Clean Air Act 4" provides for "consultation" with an advisory committee established under the Act, but such consultation is
in the Minister's discretion. There is a provision for 60 days notice in
the Canada Gazette of proposed national quality standards and of
specific emission standards for federal industries, but no procedures
for public representation are specified. A similar notice requirement
with respect to the new Land Use Regulations4 6 has given citizens
the opportunity to make written representations to the government
department, but Gazette notices frequently pass unobserved. In addition, there is no system for presenting submissions, no indication of
42. E.g., Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000-150 (West Supp. 1971).
43. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development experimented with the
representation of affected interests when preparing the new Land Use Regulations, but the
experiment was ad hoc, was without adequate forethought as to procedures, and left the
writer, as one involved, with the conviction that such representation is needed but must be
given a formal structure with procedures and responsibilities spelled out in advance.
44. The Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations, SOR/61-252, administered by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development as to the north, including offshore, and
by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources as to the east and west coast offshore
regions and as to Hudson's Bay.
45. Bill C-224 (1971).
46. See note 43 supra.
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who will study them, no opportunity to hear and rebut other submissions, and no decision or report to finalize the process other than the
promulgation after 60 days of a binding set of regulations.
Pipeline proposals which will have an impact on the Canadian
north equally as momentous as that which the oil pipeline will have
in Alaska are now under feasibility studies by four or five major oil
and natural gas consortiums. Such pipelines in Canada will require
the issue of permits of different kinds, the major permit being a
certificate of public convenience issued by the National Energy
Board.' I This Board has traditionally performed its certifying function in terms of the availability of reserves of oil or gas, the economic
consequences of the location of the pipeline, and its design and
engineering. There is yet no clear indication in Canada how the
ecological impact of a pipeline proposal is to be assessed. Requests
have been made for the issue by the government of impact statements and for public hearings before steps are taken that set the
proposals on inevitable courses toward completion, 4" but no government response to these requests has yet been announced.
It is clear that just as new administrative and institutional changes
have much to offer in the way of answers to pollution problems,
they also pose difficult questions, the legal ones being as complex as
any others. What the lawyer foresees are clearly established procedures whereby a citizen who has a substantive environmental
interest in any proposed government decision or action affecting the
enviornment will have an effective opportunity to present his reasons
and arguments for or against the proposal for consideration by those
who will be deciding or acting. The ingredients of the procedure
must include liberal definition of those citizens who can show a
substantive environmental interest, full disclosure of all relevant data,
government cooperation and assistance in carrying out necessary investigations and tests, the opportunity to present the case at the
appropriate decision-making level and in the appropriate time and
sequence, the opportunity to see and, if desired, rebut opposing
arguments, and the means of knowing what decision has been made.
Such procedural requirements can be further elaborated, and are
subject to the caveat that pragmatism and flexibility in the administrative process require that they be tailored to fit each decisionmaking role.
What he also foresees are legal and institutional changes that will
inject the citizen interest in the environment into private decision47. National Energy Board, Can. Rev. Stat. c. N-6, § 46 (1970).
48. Anderson, Government and the Environment: A Need for Public Participation, 6
U.B.C. L. Rev. 111 (1971).
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making as well. Normally, these changes will involve government
regulation of private decision-making through controls such as
licenses and permits, but other possibilities include institutional
changes in the structure of private enterprise, itself, such as requirements that environmental interests be represented in the management of corporations.
What the environmental lawyer believes when he places such
emphasis on the representation process is that, no matter how well
the economic system is manipulated, there will remain substantial
environmental concerns that are not reflected in the market place
unless individual citizens and groups of citizens are recognized as
having the legal right to be heard. He believes that the benefits of
citizen participation will, in the long run, outweigh the costs imposed
on entrepreneurs by such representation requirements.
CONTRIBUTION TO CONSCIOUSNESS
ABOUT POLLUTION PROBLEMS
Most students of juridical science see law as shaping values as well
as reflecting them, and as contributing to consciousness as well as
answering to its dictates. If, as Charles Reich maintains, a Consciousness III is emerging in North America that is more mindful and
considerate of the natural world, 4 9 the law will both respond and
contribute to this new consciousness as the legal system begins to
deal with environmental problems. Contribute it must, for legal
stratagems are mere gossamer webs if there is no consciousness and
no ethic to give them sinew. Impact statements can be mere
bureaucratic exercises and public hearings mere playacting after decisions have been irreversibly made. Advisory committees can become
captives of the administration or neutralized by the withholding of
essential information. In the field of private enterprise, environmental departments can be mere excrescences of public relations
departments; the relatively few, qualified independent experts can be
disarmed by research contracts or retainer fees. Given the most perfectly fashioned and functioning system of environmental protection, its mainspring must be a new consciousness of concern and
respect for the natural world-a new "land ethic."' 0

49. See note 30 supra.
50. A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac 217-20 (1966).

